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Abstract
Individuals behave with choice probabilities dened by a multinomial logit
(MNL) probability distribution over a nite number of alternatives which includes
utilities as parameters. The salient feature of the model is that probabilities depend
on the choice-set, or domain. Expanding the choice-set decreases the probabilities
of alternatives included in the original set, providing positive probabilities to the
added alternatives. The wider probability spreadcauses some individuals to fur-
ther deviate from their higher valued alternatives, while others nd the added
alternatives highly valuable. For a population with diverse preferences, there ex-
ists a subset of alternatives, called the optimum choice-set, which balances these
considerations to maximize social welfare. The paper analyses the dependence of
the optimum choice-set on a parameter which species the precision of individuals
choice (degree of rationality). It is proved that for high values of this parame-
ter the optimum choice-set includes all alternatives, while for low values it is a
singleton. Numerical examples demonstrate that for intermediate values, the size
and possible nesting of the optimum choice-sets is complex. Governments have
various means (defaults, tax/subsidy) to directly a¤ect choice probabilities. This
is modelled by probability weightparameters. The paper analyses the structure
of the optimum weights, focusing on the possible exclusion of alternatives. A bi-
nary example explores the level of type oneand type twoerrors which justify
the imposition of early eligibility for retirement benets, common to social secu-
rity systems. Finally, the e¤ects of heterogeneous degrees of rationality among
individuals are briey discussed.
JEL Classication: C 35, D 03, D 81, H 80.
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1 Introduction
Early in modern psychology it has been observed (Luce and Suppes (1965))
that in choice experiments individuals do not select the same alternative in repe-
titions of identical situations. To explain these behavioral inconsistencies a prob-
abilistic choice mechanism was introduced. Two alternative approaches have been
o¤ered as the foundation for probabilistic choice. One assumes that individuals
have well-dened utilities but that instead of selecting the alternative with the
highest utility, the decision maker is assumed to behave with choice probabilities
dened by a probability distribution function over the alternatives that includes the
utilities as parameters. This can be interpreted as the analystsadmission of lack
of knowledge about individualsdecision processes. The selection of a probability
distribution function is based on specic assumptions with respect to the proper-
ties of choice probabilities. A representative model of this approach was developed
by Luce (1959). Based on an assumption referred to as the "Choice Axiom", Luce
developed the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model presented below. An alternative
approach, called the random utility approach, was formulated by Manski (1977).
According to this approach, the individual is assumed to select the alternative with
the highest utility, but this utility is treated as a random variable. Under certain
assumptions about the stochastic distribution of utilities, this approach also leads
to the MNL model. The derivation of the MNL model and the equivalence of the
two approaches are outlined in Appendix A.
The salient feature of the MNL model is that choice probabilities depend on
the choice-set, or domain. Expanding the choice-set to include additional alter-
natives decreases the probabilities of all alternatives in the original set, providing
positive probabilities to the additional alternatives.
In a population that consists of individuals with diverse preferences, all of
them facing the same choice-set, this feature of the MNL model creates a natural
tension: a larger choice-set which spreadsthe choice probabilities over more alter-
natives, exacerbates the mistakes that some individuals make compared to perfect
choice of their most preferred alternative. On the other hand, the larger choice-set
may enable others to choose their more valued alternatives not included in the
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original set. This tradeo¤ suggests that there exists an optimum choice-set which
maximizes social welfare, taking into account the distribution of preferences in the
population. Specically, the optimum choice-set is the subset of all alternatives
which maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function whose elements are individ-
ual expected utilities. The objective of this paper is to explore the factors that
a¤ect the selection of the optimum choice-set.
A particularly attractive feature of the MNL model is that a certain parameter
determines the spreadof choice probabilities among alternatives in the choice-
set: high values of this parameter imply that individualschoice probabilities are
more concentrated around their highly valuable alternatives, choosing the best
alternative with certainty in the limit. Small values of this parameter imply that
individuals make close to purely random choice. This parameter can therefore be
viewed as representing the precision of choice. We refer to it as the degree of
rationality (with perfect rationality in the limiting case). We focus on the e¤ect
that the level of rationality has on the optimum choice-set. In two limiting cases,
the optimum sets are the following (Section 2 below):
(a) At high degrees of rationality, all alternatives are included in the optimum
choice-set;
(b) At low degrees of rationality, the optimum choice-set includes only one alter-
native, totally eliminating individual choice.
For intermediate degrees of rationality, the dependence of the optimum choice-
set on the precision of choice is complex. We present numerical calculations that
demonstrate that, for example, the standard single-peakednees assumption about
individual preferences is insu¢ cient to determine that the optimum choice-sets are
nested and expand as the degree of rationality rises.
A more exible policy than optimizing the number of alternatives included
in the choice-set is to assume that the government can directly a¤ect individuals
choice probabilities. We model this by assuming that the government can attach
weights to the choice probabilities of di¤erent alternatives. In this context, the
previous analysis of the optimum choice-set can be viewed as a special case when
zero weights are attached to the choice probabilities of certain alternatives.
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These weights reect various means that governments have to a¤ect individual
choices. The importance, for example, of framing e¤ects is well documented,
particularly in the design of default options. See Johnson et-al (1993) on this
e¤ect in car insurance, Choi et-al (2003) and Caroll et-al (2009) on the dramatic
e¤ects of the design of opting-out and opting-in options on participation in 401(K)
pension plans and on other insurance decisions, or Johnson and Goldstein (2003)
on this e¤ect in organ donations.
The determination of optimum probability weights is described in Section 4,
followed by a binary example which highlights the dependence of these weights on
individualsdegree of rationality (Section 5).
In Section 6 we apply the model to the early retirement eligibility constraint
(the age at which individuals can start receiving retirement benets) common
to public social security systems (and private pension funds). Presumably, this
constraint (which is age 62 in the US) strikes a balance between those who would
sensibly like to retire earlier and those who would mistakenly retire too early,
regretting this decision later in life. We analyze the critical degree of rationality at
which it becomes socially desirable to impose this constraint in terms of the type
oneand type twoerrors that individuals make. It is shown that when more than
10-15 percent of the population choose mistakenly, then it is optimal to impose this
constraint. This result, though, is highly sensitive to the level of the replacement
rate, that is, the ratio of consumption in retirement to consumption during work.
Section 7 discusses briey possible modications required when the model is
generalized to include heterogeneity in the degree of rationality. The basic message
of this paper, though, is preserved: under bounded rationality, certain limits on
individual choice are socially desirable.
There is a vast popular literature on "too much choice". Of particular interest
are the books by Schwartz (2001) and the recent one by Iyengar (2010). Both books
provide broad insights from psychology and sociology that, on the one hand, choice
is a human conditionand, on the other hand, why consumers would be better-o¤
with fewer options.
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2 A Multinomial Logit Choice Model
We rst specify the basic MNL model. This model will be amended later when we
discuss policies that directly a¤ect choice probabilities.
Consider a population consisting of heterogeneous individuals, each charac-
terized by a parameter  ("individual "). This parameter represents personal
characteristics, such as health, longevity or attitudes towards work, which are re-
garded as private information. Individuals choose one among a nite number, n, of
alternatives, numbered i = 1; 2; ::; n: They attach a non-negative utility, ui(), to
each alternative. Choice is probabilistic. The MNL model species the probability
that individual  chooses alternative i; denoted pi(; q), as
pi(; q) =
equi()
nP
j=1
equj()
i = 1; 2; ::; n (1)
where q is a positive parameter. Clearly, 0  pi(; q)  1 and, since one and only
one alternative is chosen,
nP
i=1
pi(; q) = 1:
Note that the scale parameter q is assumed to be independent of : An inter-
pretation of q as a parameter of the underlying random distribution from which
(1) is derived (the Gumbel distribution), is presented in Appendix A. The role of q
can best be understood by focusing initially on two limiting cases:
Case 1
pi(; 0) = lim
q !0
pi(; q) =
1
n
i = 1; 2; ::; n: (2)
All alternatives are equally likely to be chosen;
Case 2
pi(;1) = lim
q !1
pi(; q) =
8><>:
1 if ui() > maxuj()
all j 6=i
0 if ui() < maxuj()
all j 6=i
i = 1; 2; ::; n: (3)
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In the event of ties among the utilities of some alternatives, ui() = maxuj()
all j 6=i
;
the limit in case 2 is
1
n
; where n(< n) is the number of alternatives for which
ui() = maxuj()
all j 6=i
; and is zero for the remaining n n alternatives. For simplicity
we shall henceforth disregard ties.
It is seen that q =1 implies that individuals choose the best alternative, while
q = 0 implies pure random choice independent of preferences. More generally, we
shall show below that a higher q raises the probabilities of more valued alternatives
and decreases the probabilities of less valued alternatives. Thus, q can be viewed
as representing the precision of choice. At times we shall refer to q as the degree
of rationality (with q =1 called perfect rationality).
Figure 1 (q1 > q0)
Figure 1 portrays the MNL model for a binary example, i = 1; 2, with   0:
Suppose that () = u1()   u2() R 0 as  Q ~ for some ~ > 0: Under perfect
rationality, all individuals with 0    ~ choose alternative 1, and those with  > ~
choose alternative 2. Probabilistic choice leads to type oneand type twoerrors:
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some who would choose alternative 1 under perfect rationality actually choose
alternative 2, and some who would choose alternative 2 under perfect rationality
choose alternative 1.
One aspect of the MNL model which received much attention is the Indepen-
dence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): the ratio of any two probabilities i and j
is una¤ected by the utilities of other alternatives. From (1),
pi()
pj()
= eq(ui() uj()) (4)
This property has important ramications, yielding counterintuitive outcomes
in some cases1. For policy purposes, however, as shown below, the IIA is an
advantage for manipulations of individual choice probabilities aimed at raising
social welfare.
3 Social Welfare and IndividualsOptimum
Choice Set
Individualswelfare is represented by expected utility, V (; q),
V (; q) =
nX
i=1
pi(; q)ui() (5)
A change in the parameter q a¤ects V through the probabilities pi(; q):
@pi(; q)
@q
= pi(; q)(ui()  V (; q)) i = 1; 2; ::; n (6)
1For example, the "Red-Bus/Blue-Bus Paradox" pointed-out by Debreu (1960). In the MNL
model, equal probabilities ( 12 ) of going by car or by bus become, in a three-way choice between
car, red bus and blue bus, equal probabilities of 13 for each alternative. To avoid such paradoxes
choice hierarchies have been o¤ered: the IIA is applied rst to choice between groups of similar
alternatives and then within these groups. However, nding an independent criterion for grouping
alternatives may be problematic. A more general model (simple scalability) proposed by Tversky
(1972) avoids some of these questionable results, but has other problems (see Ben-Akiva and
Lerman (1985)).
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Since V is a weighted average of utilities, (5), a higher q is seen to raise the
probabilities of alternatives whose utility is higher than average utility, V , and to
decrease the probabilities of alternatives whose utility is lower than V .
Consequently, a higher q raises expected utility (omitting notation of the
functional elements):
@V
@q
=
nX
i=1
@pi
@q
ui
by (6)
=
nX
i=1
pi(ui   V )ui =
=
nX
i=1
pi(ui   V )2 > 0; (7)
assuming that not all alternatives have the same utility.
Using (2) and (3), calculate the level of V in the limiting cases:
V (; 0) = lim
q!0
V (; q) =
1
n
nX
i=1
ui (8)
and
V (;1) = lim
q!1
V (; q) = ui() (9)
where ui() > max
j 6=i
uj():
When choice is purely random, expected utility is the (arithmetic) average
of utilities. Under perfect rationality, individuals choose the alternative with the
highest utility. Denote this maximum by V ; V = V (;1):
Let social welfare, W , be utilitarian:
W (q) =
Z

V (; q)dF () (10)
where F () is the distribution function of  in the population. It is assumed that
F () is dened ever a nite, non-empty, interval, (; ): For simplicity, we assume
that the density f() > 0 exists for all (; ). Since V (; q) strictly increases with
q; so does W (q);
dW (q)
@q
> 0:
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(a) Optimum Choice-Sets for High and Low Degrees of Rationality
Individual utilities are private information, but the government knows the
distribution of utilities in the population. Based on this distribution, the govern-
ment is assumed to determine the set of alternatives from which individuals make
choices, called the choice-set. In this context, optimum policy is taken to be the
choice-set which maximizes social welfare.
Trivially, any alternative which has a lower utility than some other alternative
for all s can be excluded from consideration since any choice-set which includes
this alternative is inferior to some choice-set which excludes it. Consequently, we
shall assume that no alternative is dominated by other alternatives for all s. This
is formalized in the following assumption. For each alternative, dene the set of
s for which it is ranked highest by some individuals:

i =

 j ui() > max
j 6=i
uj()

i = 1; 2; ::; n (11)
Assumption 1 All 
i; i = 1; 2; ::; n are non-empty.
Optimum policy for the two limiting cases discussed above is straightforward.
Maximum social welfare, W; is attained when all individuals choose their most
preferred alternative. This can be attained when the choice-set includes all alter-
natives,
W = lim
q!1
W (q) =
Z

V ()dF () (12)
Denote social welfare when all individuals choose alternative i, by W i:
W i =
Z

ui()dF () (13)
From (7),
W (0) = lim
q!0
W (q) =
1
n
nX
i=1
W i (14)
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When all alternatives are included in the choice-set and individuals choose
randomly, independent of preferences, social welfare is the arithmetic average of
the W is.
These observations point-out the optimum choice-sets in the two limiting cases
and, by continuity, for cases in their neighborhood:
Proposition 1 For large and for small qs individuals optimum choice-sets are
as follows:
(a) When q is large, the choice-set includes all alternatives;
(b) When q is small, the choice-set is a singleton, that is, it contains one alter-
native, say alternative m, where Wm > max
j 6=m
W j:
Part (a) follows directly from (9) and Assumption 1. Part (b) follows directly
from (14).
Viewing parts (a) and (b) of Proposition 1, continuity of W in q implies
that there exists a q0; q0 > 0; such that for all q < q0; the optimum choice-set
includes a single alternative, while for q  q0 the choice-set includes two or more
alternatives. Intuitively, it is expected that the optimum choice-set includes an
increasing number of alternatives as q rises above q0. We shall now study this
process in some detail.
(b) Optimum Choice-Sets in Intermediate Cases
We now wish to address the general question of the dependence of the opti-
mum choice-set on the level of q. Let S be a subset of f1; 2; 3; ::; ng: The choice
probabilities for i 2 S;, pSi (; q); are equal to pSi (; q) =
equi()
nP
iS
equi()
: By denition, the
probabilities of alternatives not in S are zero
P
iS
pSi (; q) = 1

: With choice-set
S, expected utility, V S(; q); is equal to V S(; q) =
P
iS
pSi (; q)ui(); and social
welfare, W S(q); is equal to W S(q) =
R

V S(; q)dF ():
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Denition 1 The optimum choice-set for a given q, S(q); is
S(q) =

S
 MaxS  f1;2;::;ngW S(q)

(15)
It was shown that S(q) consists of a single alternative for small qs, while
S(q) consists of all alternatives for large qs. Characterization of S(q) for inter-
mediate values is complex. This can best be demonstrated by a numerical example.
Let there be three alternatives, each identied by a number xi, i = 1; 2; 3; and
three individuals j; j = 1; 2; 3: Individual js utility of alternative i, ui, is ui(j) =
 (xi   j)2: This formulation resembles Hotellings (1929) model: individuals and
stores (rms) are located on a line. Due to transportation costs, utility decreases
with the distance of individual js location, j; from store xi: In the calculations
below:
1
:5
2
1
3
2
x1
1
x2
:5
x3
1:6
By construction, preferences are (Figure 2) single-peaked (e.g. Mass-Colell
et-al (1995)).
Figure 2
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Possible choice-sets are f1g; f2g; f3g; f1; 2g; f2; 3g; f1; 3g; and f1; 2; 3g: The
corresponding social welfare levels are denotedW 1,W 2,W 3,W 1;2,W 2;3,W 1;3, and
W 1;2;3, respectively. In Figure 3, each of these is plotted against di¤erent levels
of q. For each q, the optimum choice-set is the outer envelope of these curves.
The gure demonstrates Proposition 1: at low qs, the optimum set has a single
alternative (W 1) and at high qs the optimum set includes all alternatives. Of
particular interest is the fact that the optimum choice-sets are not nested as q
rises. The choice-set f1; 2g is optimum for certain values of q between 2 and 3
while the set f2; 3g is optimum for still higher levels of q.
Figure 3
The above example also demonstrates that a subset of a certain set which has
higher social welfare than the subset at some q may become socially superior at
higher qs.
To understand the causes of such a switch, consider a subset eS of S, eS  S:
Using the above denitions,
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W S(q) W eS(q) =
Z

(V S(; q)  V eS(; q))dF () =
=
Z

X
i2S eS
pSi (; q)(ui()  V eS(; q))dF () =
=
Z

0@ X
i2S eS
pSi
1AV S eS(; q)  V eS(; q) dF () (16)
where S   eS is the set which contains all alternatives in S but not in eS, and
V S eS = P
i2S eS
0B@ pSiP
i2S eSp
S
i
1CAui is expected utility over the set of alternatives in S  eS:
The integrand in (16) is the probability of choosing an alternative in S  eS times net
expected utility of the inclusion of S   eS in the choice-set. The negative term V eS
is the lower expected utility obtained from alternatives in eS, because the inclusion
of the alternatives in S   eS reduces the probability of choosing alternatives in eS:
Suppose that W S  W eS > 0 for some q. Higher qs raise both V S eS and V eS for
all ; reecting the higher weight given to the most preferred alternative in each
set. The probability of choosing any alternative in S   eS increases for the highest
utility in S   eS and decreases all other probabilities. This lends higher weight to
the increase in V S eS: Still V eS may rise more than V S eS and even reverse the sign
of W S   S eS: In the limit, though, the integrand in (16) is equal, for each ; to
the utility of the alternative in S   eS with the highest utility, and this is clearly
positive, consistent with Proposition 1.
4 Policy A¤ecting Choice Probabilities
Since individual preferences are assumed to be private information, policy can only
distinguish between alternatives. In the previous sections it was assumed that
the government determines the optimum choice-set available to individuals. This
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approach can be generalized by assuming that the government can directly a¤ect
individual choice probabilities. The previous discussion amounts to assignment of
zero probability to certain alternatives, tantamount to exclusion from the choice-
set.
The government has various ways to inuence choice probabilities. The well
documented tendency to choose default alternatives (e.g. Johnson et-al (1993) or
Caroll et-al (2009)) is one example. Many studies show that "framing" issues (such
as "opting-out" and "opting-in" design) a¤ect individualschoices (e.g. Choi et-al
(2003)). These studies demonstrate that control over the method of choice enables
the designer, whether the government or private rms, to a¤ect choice probabilities.
Governments may also use scal instruments to shift individualschoice. As an
example of the latter, consider the imposition of a tax/subsidy, ti; on alternative
i. The policy t = (t1; t2; ::; tn) a¤ects the choice probabilities, (1), which are now
rewritten
pi(; q; g) =
eq(ui ti)
nP
j=1
eq(uj tj)
=
equigi
nP
j=1
equjgj
(17)
where gi = e qti ; gi  0; i = 1; 2; ::; n and g = (g1; g2; ::; gn): The vector g is the
weights given to the choice probabilities. The governments objective is to choose
the vector g that maximizes social welfare2. Of particular interest are cases when
the optimum weight is zero, that is, when an alternative is excluded.
Note that pi(; q; g) is homogeneous of degree zero in g: One can therefore
normalize
nP
i=1
gi = 1:
2Another method to inuence probabilities is the multi-stage choice process mentioned above.
Such process can be shown to change in a predictable way the imputed choice probability of each
alternative. To demonstrate this, consider three alternatives with utilities ui; i = 1; 2; 3; ::: In
a one-stage choice, the probability of choosing alternative i is pi = equi=
3P
j=1
equj : Suppose that
the choice is rst between alternatives 1 and a packageconsisting of alternatives 2 and 3. The
expected utility of the package, denoted u^23; is u^23 = p^2u2+(1  p^2)u3 where p^2 = equ2=(equ2 +
equ3): The probability of choosing alternative 1 in a two-round choice is ~p1 = equ2=(equ2 +equ^2;3):
It is easy to show that ~p1  p1; with strict inequality when there are no ties in the uis. Thus, the
probabilities that each of the packagealternatives is chosen are raised in the two-stage process.
This can be generalized to any nite numbers of alternatives in a multi-stage process.
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The limiting cases (2) and (3) now become (as before, disregarding ties):
pi(; 0; g) = lim
q!0
pi(; q; g) = gi and
pi(;1; g) = lim
q!1
pi(; q; g) =
8<:
gi if ui() > max
j 6=i
uj()
0 if ui() < max
j 6=i
uj()
(18)
As stated in Proposition 1, the optimum policy in the neighborhood of the
limiting cases is clear. For large qs, that is, close to perfect rationality, all alterna-
tives are included in the optimum choice-set, which means that gi > 0; i = 1; 2; ::; n
(when q =1; the specic g chosen is irrelevant). At low qs, close to pure random
choice, the choice-set has only one alternative, say m; with gm = 1 and gi = 0
for all i 6= m: We want to explore the optimum weights, that is, the weights that
maximize social welfare at some q( q0): Denote these weights by g(q):
The F.O.C. are
@W (q; g)
@gi
=
1
gi
Z

pi(; q; g
)(ui()  V (; q; g)dF ()  0; i = 1; 2; ::; n (19)
where
1
gi
pi(; q; g
) =
equi()
nP
j=1
equj()gj
: Equation (22) holds with equality when 0 <
gi < 1:;
The net benet for individual  from marginally increasing the weight of alter-
native i is the expected utility gain
1
g
piui() due to the increase in the probability
of this alternative minus the decrease in expected utility due to the decrease in the
probabilities of all other alternatives.
We relegate the second-order conditions to Appendix B, stating there the
conditions for uniqueness of g(q):
The determination of g(q) and the range of qs for which choice is eliminated,
is brought-out clearly in the following binary example.
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5 A Binary Example
Let i = 1; 2; p =
equ1g
equ1g + equ2(1  g) is the probability of choosing alternative 1
and g, 0  g  1; the weight given to this alternative. Using (19), the F.O.C.
condition for the optimum g, g, is
@W (q; g)
@g
=
~Z

eq()()
(eq()g + 1  g)2dF ()  0 (20)
with equality when 0 < g < 1; where () = u1() u2(): A necessary condition
for an interior solution, g; is that  changes sign at least once over (; ); that
is, following Assumption 1, each of the two alternatives is ranked rst by some
individuals.
Lets assume that
() R 0 as  Q ~ (21)
for some ~;  < ~ < : Then, for any 0 < g < 1; p(;1; g) = 1 for  <  < ~ and
p(;1; g) = 0 for ~ <  < : Maximum social welfare, W; is
W = W (1; g) =
~Z

u1()dF () +
Z
~
u2()dF () (22)
For the other limiting case,
W (0; g) = gW 1 + (1  g)W 2: (23)
For concreteness, assume thatW 1 > W 2, that is, when the choice-set has only
one alternative, alternative 1 yields higher social welfare. Hence, by (19), when
q = 0; the optimum policy is g = 1. In Figure 4, W (0; g) is a linear function of g
increasing from W 2 at g = 0 to W 1 at g = 1:
An increase in q raises W for all 0 < g < 1: At g = 1, the slope
@W
@g
decreases
as q rises (
@
@q
(
@W (q; 1)
@g
=  
R

e q2dF () < 0) while at g = 0 this slope increases
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(
@
@q
(
@W (q; 0)
@g
=
R

eq2dF () > 0). At any q > q0;
@W (q; 1)
@g
< 0; implying that
there is a unique interior solution to (20), 0 < g(q) < 13:
The direction of the change in g(q) due to a small increase in q is indetermi-
nate. It depends on the level of g: for high values of g an increase in q decreases
g; and the opposite holds for small gs.
Figure 4 (q1 > q0)
We can use the binary example to further understand what factors a¤ect q0:
Taking a linear approximation for e q; solve
@W (q0; 1)
@g
= 0 for q0:
q0 =
W 1  W 2
21 + 
2
2   Cov12
(24)
where 2i =
~R

(ui()  W i)2dF (); i = 1; 2; and Cov12 =
~R

(u1()  W 1)(u2()  
W 2)dF () are the variance of ui; i = 1; 2; and the covariance of u1 and u2; respec-
3 @
2W
@g2
=  2
R

eq(eq   1)
((eq   1)g + 1)3 dF () < 0
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tively. The higher is the mean preference for alternative 1 over 2, the higher is the
threshold for introducing alternative 2. Conversely, the larger is the diversity of
preferences, represented by the variances and (negatively) by the covariance, the
lower is this threshold.
6 Application to Early Eligibility for Retirement
Benets
All public social security systems (and private pensions) have an early eligibility
age at which a person can start receiving a pension. This age di¤ers widely across
countries. In the US it is age 62 and full benets were reached at 65, moving
gradually to 67. In the UK, early eligibility and full benets are both at age
65. Imposing a constraint of earliest age for claiming benets hurts workers who
would sensibly stop working before this age due to health and other personal
circumstances. On the other hand, it prevents people from retiring too early due
to inadequate savings or shortsightedness. The early eligibility age is supposed
to strike a balance between these considerations. To obtain some idea about the
magnitude of the mistakes which justify such a constraint, we shall apply a binary
MNL model to choice between work and retirement.
Let u(ca)  be workers utility where ca is their consumption and  is disutility
from work. Let v(cb) be the utility of non-workers, where cb is their consumption
(pension benets). Individuals di¤er in their labor disutility, ; whose distribution
in the population is F (): Take the range of  to be (0; ):
Under perfect rationality, individuals work or retire as u(ca)  R v(cb): Dene
^;
^ = max(u(ca)  v(cb); 0) (25)
Individuals with  < ^ work and those with  > ^ do not work (retire). Assume
that 0 < ^ < ; so that in the First-Best some work and some do not work.
With bounded rationality, the probability that a - individual works is given
by
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p(; q) =
eq(u(ca) )
eq(u(ca) ) + eqv(cb)
=
eq(^ )
eq(^ ) + 1
(26)
Denote social welfare when everyone works by Wa = u(ca)   E(); where
E() =
R
0
dF () is the expectation of labor disutility. Social welfare when nobody
works is v(cb): We assume that everybody working is socially preferred to nobody
working: Wa > v(cb): The relevant comparison is therefore between social welfare
with a retirement choice, W (q); and without the retirement option, Wa:
W (q) =
Z
0
(p(; q)(u(ca)  ) + (1  p(; q))v(cb))dF () (27)
W a =
Z
0
(u(ca)  )dF () (28)
Hence,
W (q) W a =  
Z
0
(1  p(; q))(^   )dF () =  
Z
0
 
^   
eq(^ ) + 1
!
dF () (29)
Since W a =
R
0
(^   )dF () + v(cb) and, by assumption, W a   v(cb) > 0; it is
seen that W (0)  W a < 0: Retirement should not be an option when individuals
decide whether to work or retire purely randomly.
As (29) strictly increases with q, there exists a q0 > 0; dened by
Z
0
^   
eq0(^ ) + 1
dF () = 0 (30)
such that for all q > q0; having a retirement option is desirable.
We present in Table 1 calculations for the case u(c) = v(c) = ln c and F () a
uniform distribution over (0; 1
3
). Since ^ =
u(ca)
v(cb)
= ln

ca
cb

; we chose values for
19
ca
cb
; the ratio of pre-retirement to post-retirement consumption (the inverse of the
replacement rate), in the commonly observed range: 1.2, 1.25, and 1.3.
For each of these values we calculated W a   v(cb) = ^  E() = ^   :056: All
these values are positive, as assumed.
Table 1
ca
cb
^ q0
percent
working
E1 E2
1:2 .18 3.29 54 .24 .21
1.25 .22 13.10 67 .15 .12
1.3 .26 26.53 79 .09 .06
In Table 1, for each value of
ca
cb
; we calculate ^

= ln
ca
cb

; the percent of the
population working in the First-Best (= 3^) and q0; the solution to (34).
Most insightful are the type oneand type twoerrors at q0; the level of q at
which choice is introduced. That is, the percent of those who work in the First-
Best but choose to retire under bounded rationality, and the percent of those who
are non-workers in the First-Best but choose to work under bounded rationality.
These are E1 and E2 in the last two columns of Table 1, dened as:
E1(q0) =
^Z
0
(1  p(; q0))dF (); and E2(q0) =
Z
^
p(; q0)dF () (31)
The size of these errors is seen to decrease signicantly as
ca
cb
increases. This
is not surprising. A rise in this ratio raises the preference for work, decreasing the
value of the non-work option.
It would be interesting to have some data about individualsretrospective view
about the extent that they misjudged their optimum retirement age, depending on
their actual age of retirement. Of particular relevance are those who retire close
to the early eligibility constraint.
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7 Varying Degrees of Rationality Among Indi-
viduals
It has been assumed throughout that individuals have a common degree of ratio-
nality, q. Relaxing this assumption requires modication of certain conclusions.
Suppose that individuals are identied by two parameters,  and q. These parame-
ters are assumed to be jointly distributed in the population. When the support of
the (marginal) distribution of q is a narrow interval then the results in Proposition
1 are still applicable. Specically, with small qs, the optimum choice-set is a sin-
gleton, and with large qs, all alternatives are contained in the optimum choice-set.
However, when the support of the distribution of q is wide, that is, individuals have
widely varying degrees of rationality, then some questions explored earlier have to
be rephrased and conclusions modied.
Consider, for example, the following question: is there a fraction of individuals
with high levels of q that warrants the inclusion of all alternatives in the optimum
choice-set?
A binary choice model will demonstrate that the answer to this question is
negative. Let choice be between two alternatives, 1 and 2. There are two types
of individuals, each identied by the pair (i; qi); i = 1; 2: Let the fraction of type
1 individuals be f , 0 < f < 1: Denote by uij = uj(i); i; j = 1; 2; and pi(i; qi)
is the probability of type i individuals choosing alternative 1. Expected utilities,
V i; are V i = piui1 + (1   pi)ui2; i = 1; 2; and social welfare, W , is W (q1; q2) =
V 1f +V 2(1  f):When only alternative i is in the choice-set, social welfare is W i;
W i = u1i f + u
2
i (1  f):
To have a meaningful problem, assume that the two types have opposite
preferences: 1 > 0 and 2 < 0; where i = ui1   ui2; i = 1; 2:
If W 1 > W 2; then alternative 1 is included in the choice-set for any (q1; q2):
Starting with W 1; consider whether the inclusion of alternative 2 is desirable:
W (q1; q2) W 1 =  

1f
eq11 + 1
+
2(1  f)
eq22 + 1

(32)
21
The interpretation of (32) is straightforward. The rst term is negative, being
equal to the loss due to the fraction of type 1 individuals choosing alternative 2.
The second term is positive and equal to the added utility of the fraction of type
2 individuals who choose their preferred alternative 2.
By assumption W (0; 0) W 1 < 0: To see the e¤ect of large di¤erences in the
qs, take q2 = 0: By (35),
W (q1; 0) W 1 =  

1f
eq11 + 1
+
2(1  f)
2

(33)
It follows from (32) thatW (1; 0) W 1 = lim
q1!1
W (q1; 0) W 1 =  
2(1  f)
2
> 0:
For large q1; the choice-set includes both alternatives. Alternatively, let q1 = 0:
Then
W (0; q2) W 1 =  

1f
2
+
2(1  f)
eq22 + 1

(34)
Now, W (0;1) W 1 = lim
q2!1
W (0; q2) W 1 =  

1f
2
+ 2(1  f)

R 0:
Even when all type 2 individuals choose perfectly, alternative 2 may not be
included in the optimum choice-set.
The di¤erence between the limiting cases (33) and (34) is that in the former
case, the welfare loss due to inclusion of alternative 2 becomes negligible relative
to the welfare gain. In the latter case, the loss is nite and so is the highest gain
(when all type 2 individuals choose alternative 2).
As this example demonstrates, when a fraction of the population has a high
degree of rationality this does not su¢ ce for inclusion of all alternatives in the
optimum choice-set. In this sense, the desirability of imposing limits on choice
remains the dening feature of our model.
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Appendix A
We describe two alternative approaches to derive the MNL model.
Constant Utility Approach
The decision maker chooses probabilistically, with utilities as parameters. This
approach makes specic assumptions about the structure of the probabilities. In
the text, pSi (; q) denotes the probability that the -individual chooses alternative i
from the choice-set S, where q > 0; a constant, plays a central role in the analysis.
Here we omit the notation for  and q: Focusing on the choice-set, we write pi(S)
to be the probability of choosing alternative i from the set S, i 2 S: Let ~S be a
subset of S, ~S  S: The probability of choosing subset ~S from S, ~S  S; p ~S(S);
is equal to p ~S(S) =
P
i2S
pi(S): The Choice-Axiom formulated by Luce (1959) makes
the following assumption about the probabilities:
A set of choice probabilities dened for all subsets of a nite set S, satisfy the
choice axiom provided that for all i, ~S and S; such that i 2 ~S  S;
pi(S) = pi( ~S)p ~S(S) (A.1)
In words, the choice probability of i from S is the product of the choice
probability of i from a subset ~S that contains i and the probability that the choice
lies in ~S. This is assumed to hold for any subset which contains i. (A.1) implies
the property of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA):
pi( ~S)
pj( ~S)
=
pi(S)
pj(S)
; i 6= j; i; j 2 ~S  S (A.2)
Luce argues that (A.2) can be viewed as a probabilistic version of the property
of transitivity. However, the "Red bus - Blue bus Paradox" discussed above (f.n.1)
demonstrates that the choice-axiom is less appropriate when alternatives are similar
and may, in turn, induce manipulations of the choice-set.
Luce (1959) proves that if the choice-axiom holds and a positive utility mea-
sure, Ui, is proportional to the probability of i, then these probabilities can be
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written
pi(S) =
UiP
j2S
Ui
(A.3)
The utilities Ui are unique up to multiplication by a positive constant (see the
discussion in Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985)). Writing ui = lnUi; (A.3) is seen to
be the MNL model
pi(S) =
euiP
j2S
euj
(A.4)
Random Utility Approach
Manski (1977) made the argument that while individuals always choose the alter-
native with the highest utility, these utilities are not known to the analyst with
certainty and should therefore be treated as random variables. For a description
of the possible sources of randomness, such as unobserved attributes ( in our
notation), see Manski (1977) and Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985).
The probability that alternative i will be chosen is equal to the probability
that its utility, Ui, is greater or equal than the utilities of all other alternatives in
S:
pi(S) = prfUi  Uj; all j 2 Sg; i = 1; 2; ::; n (A.5)
(disregarding ties). Specic assumptions on the joint distribution of the ran-
dom utilities fUi; i 2 Sg are required in order to solve (A.5).
Manski assumes that utilities have a deterministic ("systematic") component,
which can in principle be estimated, denoted Vi, and a pure disturbance term,
denoted "i:
Ui = Vi + "i; i = 1; 2; ::; n (A.6)
Hence,
pi(S) = prfVi + "i  max
j 2 S
j 6= i
(Vj + "j)g (A.7)
In order to solve (A.7), assumptions are made on the joint distribution of
f"1; "2; ::; "ng: Generally, this is quite complex. However, when all the disturbances
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are i:i:ds and follow a Gumbel distribution with a common scale parameter q, q > 0,
then (A.7) is equivalent to the MNL model (see Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985)):
pi(S) =
eqViP
j2S
eqVj
(A.8)
The Gumbel distribution, F ("); is
F (") = exp[ e q"] (A.9)
This distribution has the properties that any linear transformation of the "s is
also Gumbel distributed, the di¤erence between two Gumbel distributed variables,
"1   "2; is also Gumbel distributed and, most important, when "i are all i.i.d.
Gumbel distributed, then the max("1; "2; ::; "n) is also Gumbel distributed. These
properties enable the derivation of (A.8). For the original derivation see Domencich
and McFadden (1975). Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) discuss the importance of
the i.i.d. assumption and homoscedasticity.
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Appendix B
Optimum Probability Weights
The F.O.C., (19) in the text, are
@W (q; g)
@gi
=
1
gi
Z

pi(; q; g
)i(; q; g) dF ()  0; i = 1; 2; ::; n (B.1)
where i(; q) = ui()   V (; q; g); i = 1; 2; ::; n: Equation (B.1) with equality
when 0 < gi < 1:
Using the denition of pi(; q; g); (20), after some manipulations,
@2W (q; g)
@gj @gi
=   1
gi g

j
Z

pi(; q; g
)pj(; q; g)(i(; q; g)+
+j(; q; g
))dF () i; j = 1; 2; ::; n (B.2)
Su¢ cient second-order conditions are that the matrix

@2W
@gi @gj

is negative
semi-denite (because of the constant gi = 1).
Diagonal terms are equal to
@2W (q; g)
@g2i
=   2
g2i
Z

p2i (; q; g
)i(; q; g) dF () (B.3)
Assume that pii is monotone in ; changing sign at some ~i;  < ~i < :
Suppose that pii decreases in  (same argument applies in the opposite case).
Since pi > 0 also decreases in ;
p2i (; q; g
)i(; q; g) > pi(~; q; g)pi(; q; g)i(; q; g) (B.4)
for all  2 (; ): Integrating, using (B.1) (for an interior g):
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Z

p2i (; q; g
)i(; q; g)dF () > pi(~; q; g)
Z

pi(; q; g
)i(; q; g)dF () = 0
(B.5)
Hence, by (B.3),
@2W
@g2i
< 0; i = 1; 2; ::; n:
A su¢ cient condition for an o¤-diagonal element to be positive is that pi(; q; g)
and pj(; q; g) change with  in opposite directions for all i 6= j: Thus, when pii
decreases in  and pjj increases in ; both changing sign once over (; ) at ~i
and ~j respectively, then (omitting the notation of the elements in the functions),
at an interior g; rewrite (B.2)
@2W
@gi @gj
=   1
gi g

j
Z

pipj(i +j)dF () =
=   1
gi g

j
24 Z

pj(pii)dF () +
Z

pi(pjj)dF ()
35 (B.6)
Each term in the square brackets satises pj(pii) < pj(~i; q; g)  pii; for all
: Integrating, using (B.1)
Z

pj(pii)dF () < pj(~i; q; g
)
Z

pii dF () = 0 (B.7)
The same calculation shows that the second term in the square brackets is
negative. It now follows from (B.6) that
@2W
@gi @gj
> 0:
Of course, for more than two alternatives, the above argument cannot apply
to all pairs i; j; i 6= j:We have to assume directly that all o¤-diagonal elements in
the matrix

@2W
@gi @gj

are positive. This is well-known to imply that this matrix is
negative semi-denite.
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